INTRODUCTION
It seems unproblematic to agree that the equal-angles law, or law of reflection, is the most basic law in the study of optical reflection. And it also seems unproblematic to agree that it has enjoyed this preeminent role ever since the work of the ancient and medieval Arabic and Latin opticians, who offered geometrical and theoretical as well as empirical justifications of the law. Yet it is perhaps not exaggerated at the same time to regard that role as significantly restricted insofar as the law appeared in the context of a very specific field of study-catoptrics. In other words, until Kepler's work in optics, the standard answer to the question 'on what kind of surface reflection can take place?' was that notwithstanding one's commitments to Nuncius, XXV, 2-2010, pp. 213-240 Kepler's generalization of the law of reflection depends on two central aspects of his natural philosophy: his theory of light and his theory of bodies. The paper clarifies these two theories and shows how they provided Kepler with a new way to justify the equal-angles law. In particular, the paper argues for the materiality of light and emphasizes the pellucid -rather than the transparent -nature of bodies, which entails an understanding of reflection in terms of forces, collisions, and matter in motion. This interpretation challenges the Neoplatonic reading of Kepler's optics, and places Kepler's optics more on the side of the mechanicist reading of it. The paper also discusses how Kepler's justification is revolutionary for its time and explores some of its scientific and historical consequences.
ABSTRACT either visual or luminous rays, reflection could take place only on mirrors. Other surfaces could obviously be seen through mirrors, but they would never be able to reflect visual or luminous rays.
This view probably derived directly from the theoretical options at hand for pre-Keplerian opticians. After all, if one were an extramissionist, one would surely conclude that when one's visual rays reached for example, an apple, one would simply see the apple. They would not reflect off the apple. On the other hand, if one were an intromissionist, one would surely defend, as Ibn al-Haytham, Witelo, Bacon, and Pecham did, a difference between primary (or essential) and secondary (or accidental) lights. Primary lights were those radiated by a luminous body such as the sun. When these lights reached another body, that body would absorb them and then a new kind of light, secondary lights, would emanate from it. So, neither did the apple reflect luminous rays according to the intromissionists either. It rather absorbed (or something like that) primary lights and then secondary lights emanated from it. Ibn al-Haytham put it in this way:
Let us call 'secondary lights' those lights that emanate from accidental lights. I say, then, that these secondary lights do not emanate from accidental lights by way of reflection, i.e. in the manner of reflection of light from polished bodies. Rather, they emanate from them in the way that the primary or essential lights emanate from self-luminous bodies. Further, if light radiates on any polished bodies, or on bodies some parts of which are polished, it will be reflected from them. And yet a secondary light will emanate from them in the way that light emanates from self-luminous bodies.
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My purpose in this essay is to show that based on his answer to the question mentioned above, Kepler achieved a generalization of the equalangles law that supposed an entire transformation of the science of optics as a whole -and not just of catoptrics in particular. As far as I can tell, this revolution has never been noticed before. The best studies of Kepler's optics that I know 2 have primarily focused on problems such as Kepler's
